Trump DESTROYS Century-Old Court Protections

The Supreme Court appears poised to hand Trump a constitutional victory that could fundamentally reshape the federal government by dismantling nearly a century of precedent protecting independent regulatory agencies from presidential control.

Story Overview

Supreme Court justices signaled willingness to allow Trump to fire FTC commissioners at will, overturning 90-year-old protections
The case directly challenges Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), which established independence for multi-member regulatory commissions
A Trump victory could extend presidential firing power to other independent agencies like the SEC, FCC, and Federal Reserve
Conservative justices suggested a narrow ruling for Trump while reserving broader questions about other agencies for future cases

The Constitutional Earthquake in the Making

Trump’s legal challenge centers on his assertion that Article II of the Constitution grants him absolute authority to remove Federal Trade Commission commissioners at will, regardless of statutory protections. The current law shields FTC commissioners from presidential removal except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” This protection has stood since 1935, when the Supreme Court ruled in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that independent commissions exercising “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions deserved insulation from political interference.

The stakes extend far beyond one commissioner’s job security. Trump’s case represents the latest salvo in a conservative legal movement to consolidate executive power under what scholars call the “unitary executive” theory. This doctrine holds that virtually all executive branch officials should answer directly to the president, eliminating the independent agency structure that has governed American regulation since the New Deal era.

Supreme Court Signals Willingness to Rewrite Administrative Law

During oral arguments, conservative justices demonstrated remarkable openness to Trump’s position, suggesting they view current removal protections as constitutionally suspect. Justice Samuel Alito specifically indicated the Court could rule for Trump in the FTC case while “reserving decision” on other agencies that may come before them later. Justice Amy Coney Barrett similarly signaled support for expanding presidential removal power while potentially limiting the ruling’s immediate scope.

This judicial receptiveness builds on recent Supreme Court decisions that have steadily eroded agency independence. The Court’s 2020 ruling in Seila Law v. CFPB eliminated removal protections for single-director agencies, and Collins v. Yellen extended that logic to the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The FTC case represents the logical next target: multi-member commissions that have historically enjoyed stronger constitutional protection than their single-director counterparts.

The Domino Effect That Could Transform Government

Legal observers widely expect the conservative majority to side with Trump, but the reasoning matters enormously for future cases. A broad ruling rejecting Humphrey’s Executor entirely would immediately place dozens of independent agencies in constitutional jeopardy. The Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Communications Commission, National Labor Relations Board, and potentially even the Federal Reserve could face similar challenges to their independence from presidential control.

The practical implications would reshape American governance in ways not seen since the New Deal. Presidents could rapidly restructure regulatory agencies to match their policy priorities, replacing commissioners who resist their agenda. Antitrust enforcement, consumer protection, financial regulation, and telecommunications policy would become directly answerable to whoever occupies the White House, potentially creating dramatic policy swings with each election cycle.

Constitutional Principles Versus Political Pragmatism

Trump’s advocates argue that independent agencies violate the Constitution’s separation of powers by creating a “fourth branch” of government accountable to no one. They contend that democratic accountability requires voters to hold presidents responsible for regulatory policy, which demands direct presidential control over regulators. This position aligns with originalist constitutional interpretation and conservative skepticism toward unelected bureaucratic power.

Defenders of agency independence warn that politicizing regulatory enforcement could undermine market stability and public trust. They argue that some government functions—particularly those involving complex technical expertise or sensitive enforcement decisions—benefit from insulation from short-term political pressures. The tension reflects a fundamental disagreement about whether democratic accountability or professional expertise should predominate in regulatory decision-making.